Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, Spring-Summer 2003

U.S. Invasion of Iraq

Invasion launched, March 19

145,000 ground forces

*Conventional warfare

Capture of Baghdad, April 9

Liberators or occupiers? (Riverbend, p. 15)

Saddam's statue falls, April 9, 2003

G. W. Bush approval ratings 77%

Role of Media

Saddam's statue falls, April 9, 2003

U.S. (Anderson, Fig. 7) vs. European and Middle Eastern (BBC and al-Araby) Media

On April 9, “between 11 a.m. and 8 p.m. that day Fox replayed the toppling every 4.4 minutes, and CNN every 7.5 minutes” (Peter Maas, “The Toppling,” The New Yorker, Jan. 10, 2011. This article is an example of high-quality investigative journalism.)

Iraqi Governing Authorities

Office of Reconstruction & Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA)

Ret. Lt. General Jay Garner

Appointed, Jan. 20, 2003

Dismissed, April 24, 2003

*Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), April 2003-June 2004

*Ret. Ambassador L. Paul Bremmer

Arrived, May 12, 2003

Anderson, Bush's Wars, 131-49; Riverbend, 5-25

1. What is Riverbend's background and perspective?

How reliable is she as an informant about the war?

How does her perspective on Iraq differ from that of Anderson?

2. . What public safety problems do Anderson and Riverbend describe in Iraq in 2003?

Why was it impossible for Riverbend to continues working after the U.S. invasion?

3. According to Anderson and Riverbend, what role did poor U.S. pre-war planning for the invasion and occupation play?

Methods: Evaluating Riverbend as a Source of Information

Riverbend’s perspective

Urban

Baghdad

Population of 7.3 million

¼ to 1/5 of Iraq’s total

Muslim

Secular nationalist

Highly educated

Upper middle class?

Value of Riverbend’s testimony

Eyewitness

Stories of relatives, friends and neighbors

Perceptions of events in the news

Alienating the Iraqi Public

Public safety fears (Riverbend, pp. 7-10, 16-25 on Aug. 19, 20, 23, 24, 2003)

Looting, April 2003

Criminal gangs & religious vigilantes

U.S. soldiers

Problems of Pre-War Planning, 2002-2003

Bush and Rumsfeld doctrines

War without clear national interests

Poor diplomatic and military strategy

Poor intelligence

*"Cherry picking" evidence

Iraqi exiles as intelligence sources

*Ahmad al-Chalabi (Anderson p. 115 & numerous mentions in Anderson & Riverbend)

Influential in Dept. of Defense

Why is it dangerous to rely only on intelligence sources who are political enemies of a foreign power?

Ethnocentric expectations of Iraq

Low estimate of invasion/occupation force (145,000)

470,000 based on Bosnia/Kosovo (Joint Task Force IV)

“Several hundred thousand,” Gen. Eric Shinseki (Anderson, p. 125)

500,000 (RAND Corp.)

Other estimates range from 380,000-500,000 (Anderson, p. 137)

No plans for policing or “rules of engagement” to enforce public safety (Anderson, p. 142)

Unrealistic ”exit plan” scheduled for August 2003 (Anderson, p. 141)